When is it fair to say a model “believes” or “wants”?
Collect about 50 recent safety papers and lab blog posts. Code every mental-state verb applied to a model (believes, wants, knows, lies, schemes) and note the evidence each claim rests on.
Read three AI lab blog posts and highlight every time a model is said to “believe”, “want”, “know”, “lie” or “scheme”. For each, ask: what evidence backs this claim up?
Mental-state language shapes how the public and policymakers think about AI. It is sometimes justified and sometimes not, and noticing the difference is a skill.
Output: A short coded list and a paragraph of guidance.
Choose recent research posts from AI labs or safety organisations.
Mark every mental-state word applied to a model.
For each, note what the claim rests on: behaviour, internal evidence (interpretability), or nothing in particular.
Using Dennett’s idea that belief-talk is justified when it helps predict behaviour, write one sentence on when such language seems fair.
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Share what you made, then try another project. The PDF version has room for notes.
Next: When is it fair to say a model “believes” or “wants”? Next steps
Collect about 50 recent safety papers and lab blog posts. Code every mental-state verb applied to a model (believes, wants, knows, lies, schemes) and note the evidence each claim rests on.
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